Subjective character of experience in medical ethics: A reply to Atkins

Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):219–223 (2004)
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Abstract

Kim Atkins argues that Thomas Nagel’s argument regarding a bat’s phenomenal experience is important for understanding the value placed on patient autonomy in medical ethics. In this paper I demonstrate that Atkins’s argument (a) is based on her misinterpretations of Nagel’s argument, and (b) can be established without appealing to such a controversial assumption as that which she makes.

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Yujin Nagasawa
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

The Value of Applied Philosophy.Suzanne Uniacke - 2016 - In Kimberley Brownlee, David Coady & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
Autonomy and the subjective character of experience.Kim Atkins - 2000 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):71–79.

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