Abstract

In this dissertation I explore the status of individual conscience in Hegel's practical philosophy. The place of conscience in Hegel's system has remained ambiguous because he both includes it in his System, and offers a resounding critique of a theory of normativity that takes conscience as an infallible, brute Given. The challenge is to understand how Hegel conceives of the relation between individual reliance on her own beliefs, on the one hand, and the social conception of rationality that Hegel explicates in terms of mutual recognition, on the other. To unpack the connection of autonomy and recognition, I present the views of conscience in Hegel's two main predecessors, Kant and Fichte. I also detail Hegel's philosophical development, examining those early writings in which he criticizes and appropriates the idealist theories of Kant and Fichte. I then present a line by line analysis of the paragraphs on conscience in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, arguing that the conscience problematic is central to the book's project. In the final chapter I situate conscience within the Philosophy of Right, and claim that Hegel's conception of conscience allows him to overcome the dichotomy of morality and right in liberal theory. Throughout the dissertation, I resist an overly "reconciliationist" view of Hegel's theory, and claim that he succeeds in theorizing both the social unity and individual difference involved in acting on modern ethical norms