Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?

Faith and Philosophy 36 (3):291-312 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet it, successfully replying to the objections without relying on the problematic kinds of substantive moral claims. Theists have a distinctive and plausible reply to epistemological objections to moral realism.

Similar books and articles

A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism.Justin Morton - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):233-253.
Moral Realism: A Defense.David Owen Brink - 1985 - Dissertation, Cornell University
Moral Realism: Discovering Right and Wrong.Alice Perrin - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Miami
Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):37-50.
“Are There Objective Values.Nicholas Maxwell - 1999 - The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317.
The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?Jamie Dreier - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1391-1408.
Proper‐Function Moral Realism.Jeffrey Wisdom - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1660-1674.


Added to PP

473 (#27,762)

6 months
85 (#18,503)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justin Morton
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Slaves of the passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 42 references / Add more references