“Are There Objective Values

The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317 (1999)
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Abstract

In this paper I demolish three influential arguments - moral, metaphysical and epistemological - against value realism. We have good reasons to believe, and no good reasons not to believe, that value-features, value-facts, really do exist in the world.

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Nicholas Maxwell
University College London

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