Biological Individuality and the Foetus Problem

Erkenntnis 89 (2):799-816 (2022)
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Abstract

The Problem of Biological Individuality is the problem of how to count organisms. Whilst counting organisms may seem easy, the biological world is full of difficult cases such as colonial siphonophores and aspen tree groves. One of the main solutions to the Problem of Biological Individuality is the Physiological Approach. Drawing on an argument made by Eric Olson in the personal identity debate, I argue that the Physiological Approach faces a metaphysical problem - the ‘Foetus Problem’. This paper illustrates how metaphysics can contribute to debates about organisms in the philosophy of biology.

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William Morgan
University of California, Berkeley

References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
A matter of individuality.David L. Hull - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):335-360.
Were You a Part of Your Mother?Elselijn Kingma - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):609-646.
On being in the same place at the same time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.
What Is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?Gürol Irzık & Faik Kurtulmuş - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1145-1166.

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