Grazer Philosophische Studien 36:33-54 (1989)
Abstract |
Apart from Aristotle it is Comte who most influenced Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, especially with regard to methodological questions. Brentano follows Comte not only in his attack on 'metaphysical' sciences and in his claim that sciences in their positive stage deal with phenomena; he also takes over Comte's encyclopedic law, replacing, however, sociology with psychology. In order to lay the foundations of psychology, Brentano recommends all the scientific methods suggested by Comte, but states that psychology employs as its genuine method inner perception, the neglect of which had led Comte to deny the autonomous status of psychology as a science
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Keywords | Analytic Philosophy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 0165-9227 |
DOI | 10.5840/gps1989352 |
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Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte's Positive Philosophy.Denis Fisette - 2018 - Brentano Studien 16:73-110.
On the Phases of Reism.Barry Smith - 1990 - In A. Chrudzimski & D. Łukasiewicz (eds.), Actions, Products, and Things: Brentano and Polish Philosophy. Ontos. pp. 137--183.
Remarks on the Architecture of Brentano’s Philosophical Program.Denis Fisette - forthcoming - In Thomas Binder & Mauro Antonelli (eds.), The Philosophy of Franz Brentano. Amsterdam: Brill. pp. 28-49.
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