Between Positivism and Phenomenology: Brentano's Philosophy of Science

Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook (1996)
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Abstract

Brentano plays a paradoxical role in the history of philosophy. He is the key transitional figure between two antithetical traditions: although a profound influence to phenomenology, Brentano himself was inspired by the positivism of Comte and Mill. While his students found in his teachings both a reason and the means to combat the spirit of positivism, Brentano himself believed "the true method of philosophy was nothing other than the method of the natural sciences." The incoherence of his historical role is reflected in his own development. After his retirement, Brentano developed a psychological theory of apriori knowledge intended to explain how analytic judgments can be ampliative, and he ascribed this kind of knowledge to all sciences. A consensus exists that this squares poorly with the empiricism of his Psychology or his positivist manifesto. But the model Brentano employed to explain the workings of apriori knowledge was nothing other than his own methodology in descriptive psychology, elaborated in the influential lectures of the late 1880's: a mereology of consciousness as a synchronous manifold. And this was only a formalization of the method he had practiced in Book Two of his Psychology, where the basic kinds of mental phenomena and the laws of their coexistence are described. The late theory of apriori knowledge is therefore nothing more than a fine-grained psychological analysis of what was meant by "description" all along. Even in the Psychology this description generates what Brentano would later call apriori knowledge. For among the "parts" of consciousness distinguished by a synchronous mereology are not only "separable parts", but also "inseparable parts" which are distinguishable, but not really capable of existing separately. To each such distinction corresponds a law of necessary interconnection. To describe their mode of interconnection is to know apriori that they cannot exist apart. Thus, it is the theory of "distinctions" which allows an empirical description to have apriori validity. In this respect Brentano is rehabilitating a Scholastic tradition in order to make a positive, but non-trivial science of synchronous manifolds possible. But in so doing, he invents phenomenology: the positive, but apriori valid description of the possible and necessary structures of conscious experience. Continuity in Brentano's own development can therefore be affirmed, and even the subsequent development of phenomenology is seen to have its origin in a radical form of empiricism

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Anderson Weekes
Fairfield University

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