Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account

Abstract

In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action-properties are presented—namely, those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment ‘demand’ that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all of the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content, is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue that EMs involve bodily potentiation, which is best understood in terms of felt action readiness. I then outline a hybrid account, which combines content-based features of EMs with action-readiness.

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Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University

References found in this work

Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
Do we see apples as edible?Bence Nanay - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):305-322.
Principles of Gestalt Psychology.K. Koffka - 1936 - Philosophy 11 (44):502-504.

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