Why the standard view is standard: People, not machines, understand patients' problems

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (6):581-591 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The ‘Standard View’ regarding computer-based medical diagnostic decision support programs is that, while such systems may be useful adjuncts to human decision-making, they cannot replace human diagnosticians. Mazoué (1990) disputes this viewpoint. He notes that human diagnosis is prone to a variety of errors, and claims that the processes of data collection for diagnosis and the intellectual task of making a diagnosis are independent. Mazoué believes that recent progress in computer-based diagnosis has been encouraging enough to consider the concept of “human-assisted computer diagnosis”. This commentary explains why the Standard View should remain standard. Diagnosis is a complex process more involved than producing a nosological label for a set of patient descriptors. Efficient and ethical diagnostic evaluation requires a broad knowledge of people and of disease states. The state of the art in computer-based medical diagnosis does not support the optimistic claim that people can now be replaced by more reliable diagnostic programs

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reliabilism 'naturalized'.Steven Miller & Marcel Fredericks - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (4):367 – 376.
Sweatshops, Context Differentiation, and the Rational Person Standard.John Alexander - 2011 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 18 (1):68-74.
External justifications and institutional roles.A. John Simmons - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):28-36.
Is payment a benefit?Alan Wertheimer - 2011 - Bioethics 27 (2):105-116.
The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness.Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459-484.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-19

Downloads
29 (#538,668)

6 months
19 (#130,686)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?