The Concept of Identity in Aristotle, Locke, and Buchler
Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook (
1980)
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Abstract
Further, I argue that other areas of identity theory are ultimately dependent upon this first area. No theory of how, two, a "thing" is individuated ; of how, three, a "thing"; is identically the same as another "thing"; or of how, four, a "thing" is the same thing over time or through change, can possibly be adequate unless it first tackles the question of what the "thing" in question is or may be. ;In this dissertation, I have attempted to exlore the range of theoretical responses to each of the four groups of questions, ; to show the roots of the inadequacies of these responses in Aristotelian essentialism and in Locke's notion of identity as rooted in "beginnings"; and, finally, to present Buchler's concept of identity in order to show both that it is grounded in an adequate metaphysics and that the conception of identity he offers, grounded in the categories he employs, provides a perfectly adequate conceptual tool for the analysis of all four areas which should be covered by an identity theory. In my final chapter I undertake to perform such an analysis and thus to develop a Buchlerian theory of identity. ;I argue throughout the dissertation, that one cannot offer satisfactory theoretical clarification of what I take to be the first and most general sense of identity, involving "picking-out" or "naming," unless one has an adequate notion of the "things" being "picked-out" . Such an adequate notion of "thing" is available only in a general metaphysical theory which must itself be adequate. ;In this dissertation I broadly examine contemporary literature on identity and find considerable difficulty with various attempts to resolve a range of identity problems. I then undertake an exploration of the roots of these difficulties in the classic Aristotelian discussions and in the classic modern formulation of John Locke. Finally, through an analysis of the metaphysics of Justus Buchler, I suggest that the development of a Buchlerian discussion of identity provides both adequate categorial clarification of the concept of identity and directions for the pursuit of fruitful resolutions to specific identity problems