Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):242 - 253 (2006)

Authors
Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
The basic idea of rule-utilitarianism is that right action should be defined in terms of what would be required by rules which would maximize either actual or expected utility if those rules gained general acceptance, or perhaps general compliance. Rule-utilitarians face a dilemma. They must characterize 'general acceptance' either as 100% acceptance, or as something less. On the first horn of the dilemma, rule-utilitarianism in vulnerable to the charge of utopianism; on the second, it is open to the charge of arbitrariness and lack of philosophical depth. I press this objection, and develop and defend an alternative version of rule-utilitarianism which can evade the dilemma. I call this new version 'variable-rate rule-utilitarianism'
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00440.x
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Contractualism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2020 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Variable Versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism.Brad Hooker & Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):344–352.
Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance.Kevin Tobia - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):643-652.

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