Ethics 132 (1):89-126 (2021)

Caleb Perl
Australian Catholic University
I introduce a new formulation of rule consequentialism, defended as an improvement on traditional formulations. My new formulation cleanly avoids what Parfit calls “ideal world” objections. I suggest that those objections arise because traditional formulations incorporate counterfactual comparisons about how things could go differently. My new formulation eliminates those counterfactual comparisons. Part of the interest of the new formulation is as a model of how to reformulate structurally similar views, including various kinds of contractualism.
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DOI 10.1086/715289
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

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