Abstract

As a recent special report in the Hastings Center Report demonstrates, many bioethicists are rethinking the way we regulate both biomedical research and clinical practice, as well as the sharp boundary that the field has assumed can and should exist between them. Such a rethinking is long overdue. There is surely a meaningful normative distinction between activities whose expected risk‐benefit profile is and is not “reasonable” for participants (to echo the language in the Common Rule—the core set of human research guidelines found in many federal regulations). But neither the research‐practice distinction nor the criteria underlying it—the intention of the actor, whether the activity is “systematic,” and whether its results are “generalizable”—closely track good and bad outcomes for research participants and patients or justify either the bureaucratic, paternalistic licensing system that governs human subjects research or the comparatively lax governance of medical practice. The specious distinction between research and practice is especially ripe for dismantling in light of the embarrassing fact that evidence‐based medicine remains more aspiration than reality.