Justice within a Life

American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):125 - 140 (2004)
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Abstract

Prudence--the maximization of one’s own welfare irrespective of temporal propinquity--seems to many obviously rational. Special, controversial, and often difficult argument seems necessary to show that an equivalent concern with the welfare of others is rational. But Henry Sidgwick asked an important question about this distribution of the burden of proof.

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Joseph Mendola
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

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