Abstract

The central aim of my dissertation is to establish that virtue is the foundational concept in any adequate ethical theory; thus I argue that deontological, consequentialist, and contractarian theories do not fully explain our moral experience. I clarify the concepts of virtue and the virtues and argue that they are indispensable ingredients of a moral psychology that makes satisfactory sense of the kind of feeling/rational creatures we are, of our practical identity and moral agency, and of moral action. I examine the ethical theories of Kant, Mill, and Rawls, focusing on the notions of happiness, virtue, and justice, and argue that they do not fully explain our moral experience. Further, I show that virtue is more primary in their theories than they admit. With a consideration of theoretical problems here and the further practical problems that arise as virtue becomes secondary in modern ethical theory I show that these modern moral theories are incomplete. I provide detailed analyses of the work of contemporary virtue theorists Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Edmund Pincoffs and contend that their work is insufficient to establish an adequate virtue ethics. I consider some feminist criticisms of philosophy in general and ethics in particular, and feminist ethics, as affording a new, more holistic perspective on human being and a beginning for the development of a satisfactory virtue theory. Using this perspective I explore the source of morality with an analysis of caring, justice, and soundness of mind, as the natural qualities that develop into the grounding virtues in human life; here there is the foundation for making sense of our moral experience, the foundation for rules, principles, and contracts. Finally, I evaluate the major criticisms of virtue ethics and defend the theory