Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the nature and applications of virtue ethics with particular emphasis on two components of the directive aim of ethical theorizing, viz., life plans and models for behavior and character. In addition to describing these two components, Chapter One argues that these components are necessary for any ethical theory which aims to tell us what we should do or what type of person we should become. In Chapter Two, it is argued that rule theories basically do not handle the components of the directive aim of ethical theorizing in an acceptable and straightforward manner. In Chapter Three after some of the essential characteristics of virtue theories are discussed, the connection between virtue ethics and life plans and models is made, pointing to the fact that virtue theories are better equipped to handle these components. In Chapter Four, three problems with virtue theories are discussed and answered. The problems considered are: the charge that the concerns of virtue theories can be handled by rule theories, the charge that virtue theories are structurally unable to deal with moral quandaries, and the charge that virtue ethics is relativistic. Finally, Chapter Five considers two possible ways to apply virtue theory. One application centers on the connection between virtue ethics and moral development, and the other focuses on what virtue ethics could say about euthanasia. From the above, it is concluded that virtue ethics as an independent ethical theory is indispensable. This means that in at least some areas, e.g., in guiding life and in moral development, virtue theories can have a greater impact than traditional rule theories. This is because virtue theories better accommodate life plans and models for behavior and character