Abstract
One's contemporaneous conscious mental states seem bound in a single, unified experience. Dainton argues, against what he calls the S-Thesis, that we cannot explain such co-consciousness in terms of states' being located in a single phenomenal space, a functional space posited to explain our ability to locate ourselves relative to perceived stimuli. But Dainton's argument rests on a conflation of egocentric and allocentric self-localizing, and thus fails to undermine the S-Thesis. Nevertheless, experiments on visual neglect suggest one can have unconscious mental states that are located in the same phenomenal field, so the S-Thesis fails after all. I examine a modified version of the S-Thesis according to which mental states are co-conscious when one is aware of them via a higher-order sensation that represents them as located in the same phenomenal field. But among other problems, this view fails to explain the co-consciousness of intentional states, which aren't located in phenomenal fields. Finally, I argue that a higher-order-thought model of consciousness best explains the apparent unity of experience in terms of one's tacit assumption that all the first-person thoughts in virtue of which one is conscious of one's mental states refer to the same individual