Descartes, Davidson a kauzalní impotence mysli
Abstract
[Descartes, Davidson, and the Causal Impotence of Mind] [Descartes, Davidson, and the Causal Impotence of Mind] The paper deals with the mind-body problem understood as the problem of mental causation. The paper has three parts. In the first part, the author discusses the origins of the problem in Descartes. Three alternative interpretations of his notion of causal efficiency are proposed: strong dualism, moderate dualism, and eliminativism. It is argued that strong dualism makes causal efficiency of the mental mysterious; moderate dualism makes the mental epiphenomenal; and eliminativism wipes it out. The remaining two parts of the paper examine those current theories that want to avoid both dualism and eliminativist materialism. The most important among them is Davidson's anomalous monism which is examined in the second part. In accordance with McLaughlin's objection, a residual epiphenomenalism is found in anomalous monism; it is type-epiphenomenalism rather than Descartes's token-epiphenomenalism. The third part sorts out various attempts to deal with this problem according to their relation to Davidson's notion of "strict causality." The theories discussed (those of Horgan, McLaughlin, Fodor etc.) are criticized as collapsing either to dualism or eliminativism. Finally, Searle's construal of mental causation is applauded for indicating how to avoid epiphenomenalism. However, this proposal has a different shortcoming: internalism.