Inferring by Attaching Force

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714 (2019)
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Abstract

The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.

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10.1080/00048402.2018.1564060

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Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University

Citations of this work

The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):86-101.
The guise of good reason.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):204-224.
Inferential Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.

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References found in this work

What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege (ed.) - 1979 - Blackwell.
Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.

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