Who Is Frankenstein's Monster?

In Ethics, evil, and fiction. New York: Oxford University Press (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this chapter, McGinn begins with a study of the meaning of monstrosity, in which he considers the view set out in the previous chapters that evil is ugliness of soul. Monsters seem to be visible embodiments of evil: however, the connection between physical ugliness and ugliness of soul is not logically necessary. To pursue this point, McGinn presents a close study of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. McGinn interprets the novel as a metaphorical depiction of the human condition. He argues that the life of Frankenstein's monster can be understood as a model of human life.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

The Empirical Case for Moral Beauty.Panos Paris - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):642-656.
Non‐Moral Evil.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):18-34.
On Form, and the Possibility of Moral Beauty.Panos Paris - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):711-729.
Moral Facts and Moral Explanations.Debashis Guha - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1475-1486.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references