The objective of the paper is to explicate and critically appreciate two forms of consequentialism, namely objective and subjective consequentialism. Consequentialism is a substantive moral theory according to which moral value or good is to produce/promote best consequences (in a sense welfare); and morally right consists in acting so as to promote maximum good (in case of utilitarianism) or to promote best or most good. However, the paper considers important questions, replies to which give us two forms of consequentialism, namely (...) subjective and objective consequentialism, each having their unique features, nuances and limits. Moot problems are as follows: Whether consequentialism as a theory of good is to promote actual good, that is good as matter-of-fact or expected good, that is good expected by the moral agent; and whether as a theory of right, it urges to make decisions for the promotion of good based on some heuristic devices or subjective motives, commitments and so on. Objective consequentialism, as a theory of good prefers promotion of actual good than expected good, and as a theory of right decision-making urges the moral agents to rely on heuristic devices than subjective factors. The contest has been absorbing and fierce, each having so-called strong arguments. The paper reconsiders these contesting arguments and critically examines those to conclude in favour of objective consequentialism on important counts notwithstanding, the value of motives, motivations and commitments of moral agents. (shrink)

With the rise of Practical and Professional Ethics has risen Environmental Ethics. Ethical reflections pertaining to environmental and ecological problems is not new; in the recent times we have been discussing these issues in a more methodical and organised way. Methodicity taking centre stage in moral philosophical scrutiny of matters pertaining to life and world finds sceptics throwing stiff challenges to the method of ‘activism’ involving common men for their moral perceptions and resolution of the said ethical issues. Sceptics also (...) challenge those who prefer ‘theoreticism’ involving ethicists and their sacred normative theories for the resolution of the said ethical issues. The paper tries to expound and face these sceptical challenges so that environmental ethics is not turned to a bundle of nonsense. (shrink)

Serious thinking about the models of application of ethics has enabled us to move away from ethical engineering and adopting a social-scientific vocation that is an aid to moral-engineering. Time is ripe to rethink about the charge of “structuralism” on the non-engineering model of applied ethics. If we fail to resolve this issue, a structuralist application of ethics will be unavoidable, leading way to the old engineering. The paper argues why “structuralism” is undesirable and how it is avoided in a (...) model of discourse, that clears off engineering of any kind. (shrink)

The challenge of Gilbert Harman that there are no moral facts is robust, to an extent extreme and counts most for the realists underline moral facts and moral explanations. The paper begins with the absorbing challenge posed by Harman that ends in some sort of skepticism. After a brief exposition of nature of moral facts, the paper focuses on another interesting squabble whether or not we conceive of serious moral explanation that bridges the gap between theories/ principles, and our moral (...) observations. In a separate section it has been shown that moral explanations are far too necessary for moral facts because moral facts need to have explanatory potency. Moral facts need to explain our observations of moral phenomena. The contentious issue has been addressed remarkably well by Nicholas Sturgeon and Brad Majors. I have a suggestion that cogency of ideas of moral facts and moral explanations depend among other things, on the conception of possible worlds. (shrink)

Under mounting pressure from the international communities and organizations to curb carbon emission causing disturbing climate change, and the growing pressure of domestic environmentalists and the common man in India, the government is hard-pressed to enact laws on carbon emission. However, the moot problem is whether to consider a pro-active rule of action seriously to curb carbon emission while keeping the collective scenario in view or to consider a case-by-case scenario in view. A number of people argue that a collective (...) approach is much better, and for that matter, pro-active general rules of actions are desirable for their outcomes or consequences are good or worthwhile. This is what we now call rule consequentialism, which is much different from the case-by-case act consequentialism. In this case, the rightness of political action is determined by following some rules (or policies) which are amenable to worthwhile consequences. Similarly, we may conceive of a number of general rules of action such as “curb corruption”, “curb apartheid”, “curb exploitation of woman” and so on. In this paper, I would like to revisit rule consequentialism as a normative theory of rightness of action that is not immoderately overdemanding on moral agents. However, I would justify why rule consequentialism is not only overdemanding of moral agents but immoderate as well. Hence, it is an untenable normative theory of rightness of action. (shrink)

Through the ages we have been fond of monolithic ethics, which is either synthetic or analytic; the former covers ethical interests such as the normative, descriptive, empirical, and the practical and professional, whereas the latter covers the metaethical interests covering those of the analysis of language, and the interface of the ethics, logic and epistemology, particularly the issues of proving, justification and the epistemic claims about moral value. Monolithic ethics has its own problems, which troubles us today more than it (...) did before, as it is difficult to see why both these interests cannot be assimilated though each of them well protected for their specific tasks. Rethinking in ethics today leads us to break away from the monolithic ethics – the paper argues why this should be the case. (shrink)

Environmental philosophy is well discussed in contemporary times. Yet, skeptics raise an important question: What is philosophical in environmental philosophy? The question is pertinent enough when one does not find anything philosophically substantive in environmental philosophy, namely substantive metaphysical, epistemological, axiological, and ethical inquiries in this field. At best a few fashionable philosophers talk about intrinsic value in nature. This is a serious threat to environmental philosophy that there is hardly any philosophy in it. In this paper, I argue that (...) the “real business of philosophy” should go for an urgent makeover because metaphysics apart, philosophically relevant inquiries into environmental matters include epistemological, axiological, and ethical inquiries. Interestingly, these important inquiries are not watertight in so far as environmental matters are in question. In the first part of the paper, I take a renewed look at environmental epistemology and then proceed to consider environmental metaphysics. Furthermore, I argue for a comprehensive epistemological–metaphysical–axiological–ethical inquiry that makes environmental philosophy, a vibrant philosophical enterprise. (shrink)