Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples

In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247 (2013)
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Matthew McGrath
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.
The Epistemic Insignificance of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.

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References found in this work

Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

View all 33 references / Add more references