Abstract

This essay takes its point of departure from Section 63 of Martin Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics where, after a remarkable elaboration on the problem of the animal in relation to the question of world, he calls into question the accuracy of maintaining his guiding thesis on the animal: “the animal is poor in world.” 1 Heidegger himself is not only troubled by the manner in which he situates the animal within a duplicitous framework of having and not having world but also by the manner in which he situates the quality of being poor in world as specifically a being deprived of world. He proposes the following objection to his own thesis: It is certainly true that in the case of the animal we find a not-having in distinction from the case of man. And it is equally certain that this not-having on the part of the animal is essentially different from that of the stone. But is this not-having on the part of the animal a deprivation of world, an essential poverty with regard to the world? For the animal could only be deprived of world if at least it knew something of world. But this is precisely what we have denied in the case of the animal – and indeed we must deny this all the more to the animal in view of the fact that man himself, to whose essence worldformation belongs, at first and for the most regard, does not know of world as such. However things may be in this regard, if the world is essentially closed to the animal then we can indeed talk of a nothaving, but we are never permitted to understand this as a deprivation. Consequently the thesis concerning the animal’s poverty in the world goes too far. 2 In what way is Heidegger concerned that his thesis on the animal ex- ceeds what can be rightly said of the animal? For Heidegger insofar as the animal is determined as being deprived, the essence of the animal only ever comes about in terms of its negativity in relation to the positive determinations said to be of the essence of man and its relation and access to world. We should note here, and I hope to eventually come back to this at some stage, Heidegger also adds a statement of caution that inasmuch as the animal cannot be said to be deprived of world because it does not know world as such, we, at the same time cannot properly ascertain the manner in which man knows world either. To repeat from the same quotation: “[F]or the animal could only be deprived of world if at least it knew something of world. But this is precisely what we have denied in the case of the animal – and indeed we must deny this all the more to the animal in view of the fact that man himself, to whose essence world-formation belongs, at first and for the most regard, does not know of world as such.” 3 Here, in a preliminary manner we ask how are we to distinguish between the use of the verbs to have and to know in relation to world and how, if possible, might this complicate the structure of Heidegger’s three theses? What is the difference between knowing and having world? And how does the question of the stone, animal, and man operate within this difference? Which one of us could ever dare to say that they have or know world, and how could one explain this possession-of or belonging-to, if we could call it that or think of it in those terms? These are not easy questions, but nonetheless ones we should keep in mind. At this point, however, let us continue with Heidegger’s objections to his thesis on the animal and bracket these concerns for the time being