More Than A Feeling: The Communicative Function of Regret

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):664-681 (2017)
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Abstract

Rüdiger Bittner argues that regret is not useful and so it is always unreasonable to feel and express it. In this paper, I argue that regret is often reasonable because regret has a communicative function: it communicates where we stand with respect to things we have done and outcomes that we have caused. So, I not only argue that Bittner’s argument is unsuccessful, I also shed light on the nature and purpose of regret.

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Benjamin Matheson
University of Bern

Citations of this work

The Many Flavours of Regret.Carolyn Price - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):147-162.

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References found in this work

Responsibility From the Margins.David Shoemaker - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Causes and Conditions.J. L. Mackie - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):245 - 264.
Moral Luck.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Critica 17 (51):101-105.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.

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