Jake Wojtowicz
King's College London
I explore what BernardWilliams means by regarding one’s action ‘purely externally, as one might regard anyone else’s action’, and how it links to regret and agent-regret. I suggest some ways that we might understand the external view: as a failure to recognize what one has done, in terms of Williams’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic luck, and as akin to Thomas Nagel’s distinction between an internal and external view. I argue that none of these captures what Williams was getting at because they do not allow one to take a view on one’s action. I offer two alternative accounts. One turns around what we identify with, the other concerns what we care about. Both accounts capture how I might regret, rather than agent-regret, my own action. I demonstrate that these accounts can explain the relationship between an insurance payout and the external view, and they can explain the agent-relativity of agent-regret.
Keywords Bernard Williams  Ethics  Agent-regret  External view  Thomas Nagel
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DOI 10.1017/apa.2018.8
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
From Normativity to Responsibility.Joseph Raz - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Agent-Regret and Sporting Glory.Jake Wojtowicz - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2):162-176.
Champions in the Age of COVID-19.Jake Wojtowicz & Alex Wolf-Root - 2021 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 15 (1):3-13.

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