Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331 (2011)

Farid Masrour
University of Wisconsin, Madison
An ambitious project in epistemology is to show that we have justification for anti-skeptical beliefs such as the belief that we are not brains in vats. A much less ambitious project is to account for how perceptual experience justifies ordinary perceptual beliefs like the belief that there is a cat in front of me. One problem is that these two projects are entangled in such manner that the failure of the anti-skeptical project seems to entail the failure of the project of accounting for the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs. This paper offers a way to disentangle these two projects.
Keywords Perceptual Justification, Skepticism, Dogmatism  Conservatism, Inferential Role Semantics
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00206.x
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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