Problems for contrastive closure: resolved and regained

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The standard contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox is intended to provide a way to retain epistemic closure while avoiding the excessive modesty of radical skepticism and the immodesty of Moorean dogmatism. However, contextualism’s opponents charge that its solution suffers from epistemic immodesty comparable to Moorean dogmatism. According to the standard contextualist solution, all contexts where an agent knows some ordinary proposition to be true are contexts where she also knows that the skeptical hypotheses are false. It has been hoped that contrastivist theories of knowledge can mirror the contextualist solution while avoiding this epistemic immodesty. I review the main problems for contrastive closure and argue that none of the arguments currently in the literature pose an insurmountable problem for the contrastivist solution. However, I argue that contrastivist theories of knowledge, like their contextualist rivals, are indeed committed to epistemic immodesty

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism.Kok Yong Lee - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (3):173-198.
From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Skepticism and Contextualism.Michael Hannon - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 131--144.
Living without closure.Krista Lawlor - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
A problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-292.
Closure, Contrast, and Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233-255.
The Advantages of Neomoorean Antiskeptical Strategy.Jelena Mijic - 2020 - Filozofija I Društvo 31 (4):615-628.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-11-20

Downloads
155 (#126,519)

6 months
24 (#121,857)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Hughes
University of Connecticut

References found in this work

From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Closure, Contrast, and Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233-255.
A contrastivist manifesto.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.
Externalism and Modest Contextualism.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173-186.

View all 9 references / Add more references