Abstract

In this paper I will deal with the explanatory process used in natural history and ecology. I argue that the development of knowledge in natural history and descriptive ecology is the result of a bottom-up process, which is mainly empirical and progresses continuously from entity perception to theory construction. I consider the role of observation in the development of abstract images of entities, patterns, and processes through concepts and theories from a "simple" cognitive point of view and without regard for computational aspects. I analyze whether natural history provides "real" scientific explanation or just mere observation of facts. I later discuss the role of principles and laws in the explanation of observed regularities and accidents and the importance of prediction. I use the study of the larvae of sponges to describe the process because they represent a good example of past and current scientific method. My main argument is pragmatic being that the only relevant matters of the explanatory process are the perspective from which we observe the facts, the categorization methods we are using, and an acknowledgement of their scientific rigor. We need to advance in our epistemology in order to capture all the different meanings that the word "science" has acquired rather than sticking to one dominated by currently accepted methodologies