Deterministic Probability: Neither chance nor credence

Synthese 182 (3):413-432 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories that are compatible with determinism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily, some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not chances, but also that they are not subjective probabilities either. Rather, they are a third type of probability, which I call counterfactual probability. The main distinguishing feature of counterfactual-probability is the role it plays in conveying important counterfactual information in explanations. This distinguishes counterfactual probability from chance as a second concept of objective probability.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-17

Downloads
277 (#73,474)

6 months
28 (#108,987)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Aidan Lyon
Leiden University

Citations of this work

Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Emergent Chance.Christian List & Marcus Pivato - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):119-152.
"Actual" does not imply "feasible".Nicholas Southwood & David Wiens - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3037-3060.
Simple Probabilistic Promotion.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Time and chance.David Z. Albert - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references