Simple Probabilistic Promotion

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379 (2018)
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Abstract

Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to obtain than it previously was. I argue that this view has been unfairly neglected, that it avoids serious problems faced by many other views, and that it is a contender for the correct theory of promotion.

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Eden Lin
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
On the alleged evidence for non-unpleasant pains.Thomas Park - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):738-756.

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References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Reasons that Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.

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