Carving the mind at its (not necessarily modular) joints

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):277-302 (2001)
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Abstract

The cognitive neuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a ‘mental organ’, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. This is all quite vague, and I try to make it more precise. A more precise understanding of cognitive systems will make it possible to articulate in some detail an alternative to the Fodorian doctrine of modularity (since not all cognitive systems are modules), but it will also provide a better understanding of what a module is (since all modules are cognitive systems).

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Jack Lyons
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Unconscious Evidence.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.
Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks.Jack Lyons - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
Functional Independence and Cognitive Architecture.Vincent Bergeron - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):817-836.

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