Abstract
A number of philosophers have defended the view that mental or psychological verbs share a certain distinctive logical feature, though there is disagreement as to exactly what feature it is. Harold Morick has recently accused several of these philosophers of having “ignored or misinterpreted” verbs of a certain kind, in their search for this characteristic trait of mental verbs.The verbs he is talking about are those that represent some of a person's activities, which are physical activities but which that person must allegedly be conscious in order to perform. Since a “basic sentence” containing such a verb typically entails the existence of its object's referent, Morick contends, the verb in question fails io count as “intentional” either on Brentano's definition, on Chisholm's, or on mine. Thus, Brentano, Chisholm and I have failed to make good our claim that all mental or psychological verbs are intentional.