The Problem on the Conclusion of the Syllogism in the First Figure

Cinta de Moebio 50:93-100 (2014)
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Abstract

Espino and Santamaria experimentally demonstrate that, if the syllogisms in the first figure are not presented as is the usual practice, that is, separating their two premises into two different lines, but linking the two premises into one line by means of a full stop, individuals tend to draw from such premises conclusions in which the subject and the predicate are not in the customary order, but rotated. In their view, this finding is consistent with the assumptions of the mental models theory. Nevertheless, in this paper, I will show that what this fact really depends on the approach that is adopted, since a framework based on formal logic also has resources to explain it, and hence can lead us to assume theses different from those proposed by Espino and Santamaria. Espino y Santamaría demuestran experimentalmente que, si los silogismos de la primera figura no son planteados como se hace tradicionalmente, esto es, separando sus dos premisas en dos líneas diferentes, sino en una sola línea uniendo las dos premisas mediante un punto seguido, los individuos tienden a deducir a partir de tales premisas conclusiones en las que el sujeto y el predicado no se encuentran en el orden habitual, sino invertidos. Desde su punto de vista, este hallazgo es consistente con los supuestos de la teoría de los modelos mentales. No obstante, en este trabajo, vamos a mostrar que lo que tal hecho significa verdaderamente depende del enfoque que se adopte, ya que un marco basado en la lógica formal también cuenta con los recursos para explicarlo y, por tanto, puede conducirnos a asumir tesis diferentes a las propuestas por Espino y Santamaría

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