On Keeping Things in Proportion

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3) (2019)
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Abstract

Formula One isn’t very important. You can't care about it too much. The refugee crisis is more important. You can care about it much more. In this paper we investigate how important something is. By ‘importance’ we mean how much it is fitting to care about a thing. We explore a view about this which we call Proportionalism. This view says that a thing’s importance depends on that thing’s share of the world’s total value. The more of what matters there is, the less you can care about each thing in particular. The less of what matters there is, the more you can care about each thing in particular. We argue that, in many respects, Proportionalism is superior to its competitors. It captures some intuitions they leave out and it has a powerful motivation. So, we suggest, you should keep things in proportion.

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Author Profiles

Stefan Riedener
University of Bergen
Adam Lovett
Australian Catholic University

References found in this work

Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
.Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.
Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.
The absurd.Thomas Nagel - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (20):716-727.

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