Analysis 72 (3):498-506 (2012)
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Abstract |
It is argued that there are sentences and pairs of sentences, belonging to the family of ‘truth-tellers’ and ‘no–no sentences’, such that it is possible to prove (and, hence come to know) their truth-value. It is, therefore, concluded that the kind of pathological feature affecting some truth-tellers and no–no sentences is not due to the specific kind of circularity characterizing their truth-conditions and must, thus, depend on some other reason
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DOI | 10.1093/analys/ans075 |
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References found in this work BETA
Truthmakers, Knowledge and Paradox.Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):242 - 250.
Truthmakers, Paradox and Plausibility.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):11-23.
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