Time, tense, truth

Synthese 160 (2):269 - 284 (2008)
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Abstract

Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.

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Katalin Farkas
Central European University

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References found in this work

Real Time.D. H. Mellor - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Real Time Ii.D. H. Mellor - 1998 - Routledge.
Real Time Ii.D. H. Mellor - 1998 - Routledge.
Papers on Time and Tense.Arthur Norman Prior - 1968 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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