Authors
Roberto Loss
Complutense University of Madrid
Abstract
According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be ontologically innocent in the relevant sense. After having shown that said argument is independent from the problems surrounding the infamous ‘Collapse Principle’, I will conclude that CAI-theorists should endorse a suitably ‘restricted’ version of CAI. In the final part of the paper I will then argue that the best restricted version of CAI is the theory according to which every composite entity is identical to the plurality of its atomic parts.
Keywords mereology  composition as identity  ontological innocence  atomism  collapse
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12806
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References found in this work BETA

Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
Many-One Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (3):193-216.
Composition as Identity: Part 2.Meg Wallace - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):817-827.
Composition as Identity.Peter van Inwagen - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:207 - 220.
Composition as Identity: Part 1.Meg Wallace - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):804-816.

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