A supertask consists in the performance of an infinite number of actions in a finite time. I show that any attempt to carry out a supertask will produce a divergence of the curvature of spacetime, resulting in the formation of a black hole. I maintain that supertaks, contrarily to a popular view among philosophers, are physically impossible. Supertasks, literally, collapse under their own weight.

The most serious objection to Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism is the so-called collapse argument. According to the collapse argument, logical pluralism is not genuinely pluralistic and collapses into a single privileged relation of logical consequence. In response, Caret offered an account of logical contextualism that supposedly maintains the merits of Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism while circumventing the collapse argument. In this paper, I first point out a gap in the collapse argument in (...) that it does not affect pluralists who assume that there is no uniquely strongest admissible consequence relation. This gap, then, is closed by an improved version of the collapse argument, which makes use of Eklund’s classification of types of pluralism. Finally, I discuss how Caret’s logical contextualism cannot hold up against this new formulation of the collapse argument unless implausible assumptions about the contents of normative operators are made. Moreover, by reformulating the collapse argument, I determine the extent to which logical monism and pluralism oppose each other, paving the way for fruitful future discussion. (shrink)

In this book, one of the world's preeminent philosophers takes issue with an idea that has found an all-too-prominent place in popular culture and philosophical ...

I critically examine the claim that modal collapse arguments against the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) are in general fallacious. In a recent paper, Christopher Tomaszewski alleges that modal collapse arguments against DDS are invalid, owing to illicit substitutions of nonrigid singular terms into intensional contexts. I show that this is not, in general, the case. I show, further, that where existing modal collapse arguments are vulnerable to this charge the arguments can be repaired without any (...) apparent dialectical impropriety. I conclude that the genuine debate over modal collapse and divine simplicity and modal collapse is substantially a controversy over the metaphysics of divine action, and that this constitutes a fruitful direction in which to take future discussions of the subject. (shrink)

One of the most pressing objections against Divine simplicity is that it entails what is commonly termed a ‘modal collapse’, wherein all contingency is eliminated and every true proposition is rendered necessarily true. In this paper, I show that a common form of this argument is in fact famously invalid and examine three ways in which the opponent of Divine simplicity might try to repair the argument. I conclude that there is no clear way of repairing the argument that (...) does not beg the question against the doctrine of Divine simplicity. (shrink)

A collection of 17 meditative essays and 52 weekly reflections, this book is for readers who are concerned about the daunting future humankind has created and who seek inspiration, wisdom, and spiritual purpose in the face of the collapse of industrial civilization.

I present and explain the Bohmian account of collapse in quantum mechanics.

According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than (...) the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to bring clarity regarding the doctrine of quantifier variance (due to Eli Hirsch), and two prominent arguments against this doctrine, the collapse argument and the Eklund-Hawthorne argument. Different versions of the doctrine of quantifier variance are distinguished, and it is shown that the effectiveness of the arguments against it depends on what version of the doctrine is at issue. The metaontological significance of the different versions of the doctrine are also assessed. Roughly, quantifier (...) variance concerns there being different possible existential quantifier meanings, and often the doctrine involves a claim to the effect there is no unique “best” quantifier meaning. Much of the discussion in the paper concerns what it is to be an existential quantifier meaning in the sense at issue. (shrink)

I critically evaluate the influential new wave account of theory reduction in science developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker. First, I cast doubt on claims that the new wave account enjoys a number of theoretical virtues over its competitors, such as the ability to represent how false theories are reduced by true theories. Second, I argue that the genuinely novel claim that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms from the basic reducing theory is in fact too (...) restrictive for scientific practice and should be rejected. Basic theories co-evolve with nonbasic theories in a mutually interactive way, and thus the basic theories incorporate the concepts and concerns of nonbasic theories. Third, I show that once its ontological consequences are duly noted, the reductive part the new wave account collapses into the classical theory developed within the logical empiricist tradition. As such, it still falls prey to standard anti-reductionist argument based upon multiple realizability and the cross-classification of special science and physical science terms. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics, with its revolutionary implications, has posed innumerable problems to philosophers of science. In particular, it has suggested reconsidering basic concepts such as the existence of a world that is, at least to some extent, independent of the observer, the possibility of getting reliable and objective knowledge about it, and the possibility of taking (under appropriate circumstances) certain properties to be objectively possessed by physical systems. It has also raised many others questions which are well known to those involved (...) in the debate on the interpretation of this pillar of modern science. One can argue that most of the problems are not only due to the intrinsic revolutionary nature of the phenomena which have led to the development of the theory. They are also related to the fact that, in its standard formulation and interpretation, quantum mechanics is a theory which is excellent (in fact it has met with a success unprecedented in the history of science) in telling us everything about what we observe, but it meets with serious difficulties in telling us what is. We are making here specific reference to the central problem of the theory, usually referred to as the measurement problem, or, with a more appropriate term, as the macro-objectification problem. It is just one of the many attempts to overcome the difficulties posed by this problem that has led to the development of Collapse Theories, i.e., to the Dynamical Reduction Program (DRP). As we shall see, this approach consists in accepting that the dynamical equation of the standard theory should be modified by the addition of stochastic and nonlinear terms. The nice fact is that the resulting theory is capable, on the basis of a unique dynamics which is assumed to govern all natural processes, to account at the same time for all well-established.. (shrink)

Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart explore the ability of complicated rules to generate simple behaviour in nature through 'the collapse of chaos'.

Collapse models predict the spontaneous collapse of the wave function, in order to avoid the emergence of macroscopic superpositions. In their mass-dependent formulation, they claim that the collapse of any system’s wave function depends on its mass. Neutral K, D, B mesons are oscillating systems that are given by Nature as superposition of two distinct mass eigenstates. Thus they are unique laboratory for testing collapse models that are sensitive to the mass. In this paper we derive—for (...) the single mesons and bipartite entangled mesons—the effect of the mass-proportional CSL (Continuous Spontaneous Localization) collapse model on the dynamics on neutral mesons. We compare the theoretical prediction with experimental data from different accelerator facilities. (shrink)

Wavefunction collapse models modify Schrödinger's equation so that it describes the rapid evolution of a superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states to one of them. This provides a phenomenological basis for a physical resolution to the so-called “measurement problem.” Such models have experimentally testable differences from standard quantum theory. The most well developed such model at present is the Continuous Spontaneous Localization (CSL) model in which a universal fluctuating classical field interacts with particles to cause collapse. One “side effect” (...) of this interaction is that the field imparts energy to the particles: experimental evidence on this has led to restrictions on the parameters of the model, suggesting that the coupling of the classical field to the particles must be mass-proportional. Another “side effect” is that the field imparts momentum to particles, causing a small blob of matter to undergo random walk. Here we explore this in order to supply predictions which could be experimentally tested. We examine the translational diffusion of a sphere and a disc, and the rotational diffusion of a disc, according to CSL. For example, we find that the rms distance an isolated 10−5 cm radius sphere diffuses is ≈(its diameter, 5 cm) in (20 sec, a day), and that a disc of radius 2 ⋅ 10−5 cm and thickness 0.5 ⋅ 10−5 cm diffuses through 2πrad in about 70 sec (this assumes the “standard” CSL parameter values). The comparable rms diffusions of standard quantum theory are smaller than these by a factor 10−3±1. It is shown that the CSL diffusion in air at STP is much reduced and, indeed, is swamped by the ordinary Brownian motion. It is also shown that the sphere's diffusion in a thermal radiation bath at room temperature is comparable to the CSL diffusion, but is utterly negligible at liquid He temperature. Thus, in order to observe CSL diffusion, the pressure and temperature must be low. At the low reported pressure of 5 ⋅ 10−17 Torr, achieved at 4.2°K, the mean time between air molecule collisions with the (sphere, disc) is ≈(80, 45)min. This is ample time for observation of the putative CSL diffusion with the standard parameters and, it is pointed out, with any parameters in the range over which the theory may be considered viable. This encourages consideration of how such an experiment may actually be performed, and the paper closes with some thoughts on this subject. (shrink)

In this paper, we review and connect the three essential conditions needed by the collapse model to achieve a complete and exact formulation, namely the theoretical, the experimental, and the ontological ones. These features correspond to the three parts of the paper. In any empirical science, the first two features are obviously connected but, as is well known, among the different formulations and interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, only collapse models, as the paper well illustrates with a richness (...) of details, have experimental consequences. Finally, we show that a clarification of the ontological intimations of collapse models is needed for at least three reasons: (1) to respond to the indispensable task of answering the question ’what are collapse models (and in general any physical theory) about?’; (2) to achieve a deeper understanding of their different formulations; (3) to enlarge the panorama of possible readings of a theory, which historically has often played a fundamental heuristic role. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When a Conflict Collapses on a Child: An (Aborted) Medical Evacuation of a Hazara Toddler During the Kabul Airport Blast and the Taliban TakeoverAyesha AhmadI work in the capacity of an academic researching conflict in Afghanistan. My commitment is rooted in the firm terrain of friendships that merged into sisterhood of the Afghan terrain spaning decades of war but which is also the home of poetics and legacies that (...) refuse to be clouded by the traumas of the land.As a medical ethicist situated in global health, I perceive the inadequate focus on recognising the mental health needs born from living in war as a moral injustice and a form of silencing the suffering. This injustice should be held by the geopolitical hands that play the chords of conflict.However, such research is all too often concluded before it can develop as too dangerous, or too risky, or even as unethical because potential participants are perceived (often, unjustifiably so) to be too vulnerable.Another peril of research is the boundary drawn between a particular experience of the research objective and the life experience of the research participant. Connecting as a researcher and in a personal capacity, I fell into a chasm unseen in the context from where I work in London, United Kingdom.I remember the evening before Kabul city fell to the forced control of the Taliban. My friends reminisced during a nightfall reflection on the battles where the city walls had barricaded its inhabitants from centuries of invaders trying to access the valley of a city surrounded by mountains. Kabul city is a haven for war. Its geographic location makes it desirable to conquer, but part of its desirability is because of how the mountains envelop where the languages, ethnicities, religions, and stories of the Silk Road have settled and rested. Once conquered, the city protects you. And Kabulis felt safe. And to that end, on that fateful night, we ended our conversation in the confidence of hope; that Kabul city would not fall, and with the heart of the country still intact, Afghanistan would be saved.The dawn arrived and so did the approach of the Taliban to the city gates. There were frantic and rapid whispers that transformed into screams. And then the moment came, the Taliban were within the city walls.The juxtaposition between the regular London traffic heaving and breathing, and the frantic, panicked sounds of horns and vehicles fleeing in Kabul that I heard through WhatsApp audios in the background to friends narrating their journey home, was as stark as the peace and war they both echoed. [End Page 167]Soon the stories started speaking, pleading, paining, pressuring—stories seeking survival. In the dawn, instead of the sun breaking the sky, I broke the morning to a friend during a telephone conversation who had just awoken and had not yet received the news. I told my friend that the Taliban were in Kabul city. The reaction was grief, just like the grief I had heard in their voice a few months prior when their beloved father had passed away and entered the grave before they had breathed the new dawn. In the dusk, instead of the moon shining upon the city, women, families, and children were sheltering from the darkness of the grave closing amid their breathing bodies.Then, the blast came. In the energy of the quest for safety, people, walking like pilgrims, surrounded Kabul airport, queuing like worshippers. Prayers died. Hell rose. The waiting crowd was fired upon. The air did not offer breath; instead, a final moment of the sound of war that had blighted lives.In the crowd was a family who I dedicate this article to. I write the story of the father, the mother, the daughter, and the son of that day. The family was Hazara, a disputed and discriminated ethnic minority in Afghanistan, of a legacy traced to the invasion of Genghis Khan, the founder of the Mongol Empire. Theirs is a story of travellers and a soil of stories; a particularly profound story because the parents had specialised in geology and were experts of the stones of their long heritage. Yet, still, they... (shrink)

Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. In principle, versions of the theory can be tested by (...) experiments with quantum computers. The upshot is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring. (shrink)

Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt theory opens new perspectives for understanding animal extinction. The umwelt is interpreted here as a sum of structural correspondences between an animal’s subjective experience, ecosystem, physiology, and behaviour. The global environmental crisis disturbs these meaning-connections. From the umwelt perspective, we may describe extinction as umwelt collapse: The disintegration of an animal’s umwelt resulting from the cumulative errors in semiotic processes that mediate an organism and ecosystem. The loss of umwelt-ecosystem integration disturbs “ecological memory,” which provides (...) the ecosystem with adaptive modelling and self-design capacities. Making a distinction between core and mediated umwelts, and describing different types of umwelt collapse, are suitable methods for more detailed analysis. The concept of umwelt collapse enables the reinterpretation of extinction, from an internal perspective, as a semiotic breakdown. Such an approach may help us map scenarios of animal extinction, and may lead to successful compensation strategies in adapting to environmental change. (shrink)

The thesis that nature is composed of metaphysical levels is commonly understood in terms of emergence. In this paper, I uncover a problem for accounts of emergence, the collapse problem. The collapse problem suggests that emergence merely tracks relations between arbitrary groups of properties and so cannot be used in service of the levels view. I reject several failed attempts to solve the collapse problem and argue for an alternative solution according to which emergence is not a (...) distinction between metaphysical levels, but instead tracks the unavailability of scientific explanations. (shrink)

Two Experiments demonstrate the existence of a “collapse illusion”, in which reasoners evaluate Truthteller-type propositions (“I am telling the truth”) as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-type propositions (“I am lying”) tend to be evaluated as neither true nor false. The second Experiment also demonstrates an individual differences pattern, in which shallow reasoners are more susceptible to the illusion. The collapse illusion is congruent with philosophical semantic truth theories such as Kripke's (1975), and with hypothetical thinking theory's (...) principle of satisficing, but can only be partially accounted for by the model theory principle of truth. Pragmatic effects related to sentence cohesion further reinforce hypothetical thinking theory interpretation of the data, although the illusion and cohesion data could also be accounted for within a modified mental model theory. (shrink)

After introductory reminder of and comments on Gödel’s ontological proof, we discuss the collapse of modalities, which is provable in Gödel’s ontological system GO. We argue that Gödel’s texts confirm modal collapse as intended consequence of his ontological system. Further, we aim to show that modal collapse properly fits into Gödel’s philosophical views, especially into his ontology of separation and union of force and fact, as well as into his cosmological theory of the nonobjectivity of the lapse (...) of time. As a result, modal collapse should not be conceived in Gödel so much as a deficit, but rather as a kind of the rise of modalities to the “perfect” being. We further show that, in accordance with Gödel’s ontology, the concepts of modality and time should be derived in terms of the “fundamental philosophical concept” of cause. To give an example of how a formalization of such causative Gödelian ontology and ontological proof might look, we propose the transformation of GO into a kind of causally re-interpreted justification logic. (shrink)

The relation between quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication is analyzed. As we know, quantum collapse, if exists, can result in the appearance of quantum nonlocality, and requires the existence of a pre- ferred Lorentz frame. This may permit the realization of quantum superluminal communication (QSC), which will no longer result in the usual causal loop in case of the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame. The possibility of the existence of QSC is further analyzed under the assumption (...) that quantum collapse is a real process. We demonstrate that the combination of quantum collapse and the consciousness of the observer will permit the observer to distinguish nonorthogonal states in principle. This provides a possible way to realize QSC. Some implications of the existence of QSC are briefy discussed. (shrink)

In this article, we claim that recent developments in climate science and renewable energy should prompt a reframing of debates surrounding climate change mitigation. Taken together, we argue that these developments suggest (1) global climate collapse in this century is a non-negligible risk, (2) mitigation offers substantial benefits to current generations, and (3) mitigation by some can generate social tipping dynamics that could ultimately make renewables cheaper than fossil fuels. We explain how these claims undermine familiar framings of climate (...) change, wherein mitigation is understood as self-sacrifice that individuals and governments must be morally persuaded or incentivized to undertake. [Open access]. (shrink)

Our worldview assumes that people are morally responsible. Consider our emotions regarding other people or ourselves. We often feel anger, gratitude, pride, and shame toward them or ourselves. Consider religious beliefs. Jews and Christians believe that God cares whether a person does right by others and freely loves him. Consider moral values. We value dignity, freedom, and rights. The above emotions, beliefs, and values assume that people are responsible. In particular, they assume that a person is responsible for what she (...) thinks and does, and that this is a good thing. This book argues that the above worldview is false. No one is responsible. -/- I provide four arguments for this conclusion. -/- (1) Foundation. No one is responsible because there is no foundation for responsibility. A foundation for responsibility is something for which a person is responsible but not by being responsible for something else. -/- (2) Epistemic Condition. No one is responsible because no one fulfills the epistemic condition necessary for blameworthiness. -/- (3) Internalism. If a person were responsible, then she would be responsible for, and only for, what goes on in her head. Most of the evidence for responsibility says the opposite. -/- (4) Amount. No one is responsible because we cannot make sense of what makes a person more or less praiseworthy (or blameworthy). -/- The above arguments cohere with each other, explain the responsibility-skepticism literature, and have disturbing implications. (shrink)

We introduce the Easton collapse and show that the two-stage iteration of Easton collapses gives a model in which the successor of a regular cardinal carries a strongly saturated filter. This allows one to get a model in which many successor cardinals carry saturated filters just by iterating Easton collapses.

According to the ‘collapse’ argument, episodes of mental simulation necessarily involve tacit knowledge of folk psychological generalisations. In response, I show that there is little risk that the simulation of theoretical reasoning involves such generalisations. However, the case of practical reasoning is quite different. If practical reasoning is Humean, then the risk of collapse is very great indeed. Moreover, there are compelling reasons for thinking that practical reasoning is Humean. I close by replying, qua simulationist, to the (very (...) real) prospect of collapse. (shrink)

The collapse of the wavefunction is arguably the least understood process in quantum mechanics. A plethora of ideas—macro-micro divide, many worlds and even consciousness—have been put forth to resolve the issue. Contrary to the standard Copenhagen interpretation, objective collapse models modify the Schrödinger equation with nonlinear and stochastic terms in order to explain the collapse of the wavefunction. In this paper we propose a collapse model in which a particle’s wavefunction has a possibility of collapsing when (...) it interacts with macroscopic objects, without the intervention of a conscious observer. We propose four possible conditions of collapse of the wavefunction and make testable predictions which differ from standard quantum mechanics. (shrink)

On some views, we can be sure that parties to a dispute over the logic of ‘exists’ are not talking past each other if they can characterise ‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying a certain set of rules of inference. Otherwise, we ought to be suspicious about the reality of their disagreement. This is what we call a proof- theoretic argument. Pace some critics, who have tried to use proof-theoretic arguments to cast doubts about the (...) reality of disagreements about the logic of ‘exists’, we argue that proof-theoretic arguments can be deployed to establish the reality of several such disagreements. Along the way, we will also utilise this technique to establish similar results about some disagreements over the logic of identity. (shrink)

It is emphasized that the collapse postulate of standard quantum theory can violate conservation of energy-momentum and there is no indication from where the energy-momentum comes or to where it goes. Likewise, in the Continuous Spontaneous Localization (CSL) dynamical collapse model, particles gain energy on average. In CSL, the usual Schrödinger dynamics is altered so that a randomly fluctuating classical field interacts with quantized particles to cause wavefunction collapse. In this paper it is shown how to define (...) energy for the classical field so that the average value of the energy of the field plus the quantum system is conserved for the ensemble of collapsing wavefunctions. While conservation of just the first moment of energy is, of course, much less than complete conservation of energy, this does support the idea that the field could provide the conservation law balance when events occur. (shrink)

The collapse of society is inevitable, even if it is in the distant future. When it collapses, it is likely to do so within the lifetimes of some people. These people will have matured in pre-collapse society, experience collapse, and then live the remainder of their lives in the post-collapse world. I argue that this group of people—the transitional generation—will be the worst off from societal collapse, far worse than subsequent generations. As the transitional generation, (...) they will suffer disparately. This intergenerational disparity in suffering is inequitable. Given that other disparities in suffering are worthy of remediation, this intergenerational disparity in suffering is worthy of remediation. However, the only way to do so is to target the mental states of the members of the transitional generation. (shrink)

Several complexity theorists draw a sharp and ontologically robust distinction between (merely) complicated systems and (genuinely) complex systems. I argue that this distinction does not hold. Upon fine-grained analysis, ostensibly complicated systems turn out to be complex systems. The purported boundary between the complicated and the complex appears to be vague rather than sharp. Systems are complex by degrees.

GRW theory offers precise laws for the collapse of the wave function. These collapses are characterized by two new constants, \ and \ . Recent work has put experimental upper bounds on the collapse rate, \ . Lower bounds on \ have been more controversial since GRW begins to take on a many-worlds character for small values of \ . Here I examine GRW in this odd region of parameter space where collapse events act as natural disasters (...) that destroy branches of the wave function along with their occupants. Our continued survival provides evidence that we don’t live in a universe like that. I offer a quantitative analysis of how such evidence can be used to assess versions of GRW with small collapse rates in an effort to move towards more principled and experimentally-informed lower bounds for \. (shrink)

The existence of spacetime singularities is one of the biggest problems of nowadays physics. According to Penrose, each physical singularity should be covered by a “cosmic censor” which prevents any external observer from perceiving their existence. However, classical models describing the gravitational collapse usually results in strong curvature singularities, which can also remain “naked” for a finite amount of advanced time. This proceedings studies the modifications induced by asymptotically safe gravity on the gravitational collapse of generic Vaidya spacetimes. (...) It will be shown that, for any possible choice of the mass function, quantum gravity makes the internal singularity gravitationally weak, thus allowing a continuous extension of the spacetime beyond the singularity. (shrink)

I discuss the interpretation of spontaneous collapse theories, with particular reference to Bell's suggestion that the stochastic jumps in the evolution of the wave function should be considered as local beables of the theory. I develop this analogy in some detail for the case of non-relativistic GRW-type theories, using a generalisation of Bell's notion of beables to POV measures. In the context of CSL-type theories, this strategy appears to fail, and I discuss instead Ghirardi and co-workers' mass-density interpretation and (...) its relation to Schrödinger's original charge-density interpretation. This discussion is extended to relativistic CSL-type theories. A few remarks on Everett's interpretation conclude the paper. (shrink)

Several approaches to developing a theory of quantum gravity suggest that spacetime—as described by general relativity—is not fundamental. Instead, spacetime is supposed to be explained by reference to the relations between more fundamental entities, analogous to `atoms' of spacetime, which themselves are not (fully) spatiotemporal. Such a case may be understood as emergence of \textit{content}: a `hierarchical' case of emergence, where spacetime emerges at a `higher', or less-fundamental, level than its `lower-level' non-spatiotempral basis. But quantum gravity cosmology also presents us (...) with the possibility of emergence of \textit{context}: where spacetime emerges from some `prior' non-spatiotemporal state (replacing the Big Bang), due to particular conditions in the early universe. I present a general conception of emergence which is plausibly able to accommodate both pictures. This is a positive conception that does not rely on a failure of reduction or explanation in any sense (indeed, reduction is a necessary feature of quantum gravity, and is useful in understanding emergence in this case). I also consider the possibility that the distinction between content- and context- based explanations is blurred, or usefully `collapsed', in the case of spacetime emergence. (shrink)

A familiar interpretation of quantum mechanics (one of a number of views sometimes labeled the "Copenhagen interpretation'"), takes its empirical apparatus at face value, holding that the quantum wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation except on certain occasions of measurement, when it collapses into a new state according to the Born rule. This interpretation is widely rejected, primarily because it faces the measurement problem: "measurement" is too imprecise for use in a fundamental physical theory. We argue that this is (...) a weak objection, as there may be many ways of making "measurement" precise. However, measurement-collapse interpretations face a more serious objection: a dilemma tied to the quantum Zeno effect. Is measurement itself an observable that can enter superpositions? If yes, then the standard measurement-collapse dynamics is ill-defined. If no, then (at least if measurement is an observable), measurements can never start or finish. The best way out is to deny that measurement is an observable, but this leads to strong and revisionary consequences. This reinforces the view that there is no nonrevisionary interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Fortis, the leading Benelux financial group, had been a success story of successive mergers of bank and insurance companies, with leadership in corporate social responsibility (CSR). One year after the acquisition of the major Dutch financial conglomerate ABN AMRO, the global financial crisis caused the collapse of the Fortis group. The purpose of this article is to use the case study of Fortis’s recent fall as a basis for reflective considerations on the financial crisis, from stakeholder and ethical perspectives. (...) A selected number of key events of the history of the dramatic crisis at Fortis will be analysed from different ethical frameworks. Special consideration will be given to fairness of communication, shareholder activism and conflicts of interests of CEO’s mergers opportunities. A confrontation between the CSR policy and the reality raises the fundamental questions why the powerful CSR guidelines and ethical principles did not help in the assessment of the risks. (shrink)

We define what it means for a function on ω1 to be a collapsing function for λ and show that if there exists a collapsing function for +, then there is no precipitous ideal on ω1. We show that a collapsing function for ω2 can be added by forcing. We define what it means to be a weakly ω1-Erdös cardinal and show that in L[E], there is a collapsing function for λ iff λ is less than the least weakly ω1-Erdös (...) cardinal. As a corollary to our results and a theorem of Neeman, the existence of a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals does not imply the existence of precipitous ideals on ω1. We also show that the following statements hold in L[E]. The least cardinal λ with the Chang property ↠ is equal to the least ω1-Erdös cardinal. In particular, if j is a generic elementary embedding that arises from non-stationary tower forcing up to a Woodin cardinal, then the minimum possible value of j is the least ω1-Erdös cardinal. (shrink)

Moral responsibility and morality lie at the heart of how we view the world. In our daily life, we feel responsibility-related emotions: gratitude, pride, love, forgiveness, resentment, indignation, and shame. We love those who freely and reciprocally love us. Also, we feel that people act rightly or wrongly, make the world better or worse, and are virtuous or vicious. These policies are central to our justifying how we see the world and treat others. In this book, I argue that our (...) views on these matters, except love, are false. (shrink)

Recently a number of works in meta-ontology have used a variant of J.H. Harris's collapse argument in the philosophy of logic as an argument against Eli Hirsch's quantifier variance. There have been several responses to the argument in the literature, but none of them have identified the central failing of the argument, viz., the argument has two readings: one on which it is sound but doesn't refute quantifier variance and another on which it is unsound. The central lesson I (...) draw is that arguments against quantifier variance must pay strict attention to issues of translation and interpretation. The paper also has a substantial appendix in which I prove the equivalence of plural mereological nihilism and standard first-order atomistic mereology; results of this kind are often appealed to in the literature on quantifier variance but without many details on the nature or proof of the result. (shrink)

John Broome has argued that value incommensurability is vagueness, by appeal to a controversial about comparative indeterminacy. I offer a new counterexample to the collapsing principle. That principle allows us to derive an outright contradiction from the claim that some object is a borderline case of some predicate. But if there are no borderline cases, then the principle is empty. The collapsing principle is either false or empty.

The Hilbert program was actually a specific approach for proving consistency, a kind of constructive model theory. Quantifiers were supposed to be replaced by ε-terms. εxA(x) was supposed to denote a witness to ∃xA(x), or something arbitrary if there is none. The Hilbertians claimed that in any proof in a number-theoretic system S, each ε-term can be replaced by a numeral, making each line provable and true. This implies that S must not only be consistent, but also 1-consistent. Here we (...) show that if the result is supposed to be provable within S, a statement about all Pi-0-2 statements that subsumes itself within its own scope must be provable, yielding a contradiction. The result resembles Gödel's but arises naturally out of the Hilbert program itself. (shrink)

Reinhardt’s conjecture, a formalization of the statement that a truthful knowing machine can know its own truthfulness and mechanicalness, was proved by Carlson using sophisticated structural results about the ordinals and transfinite induction just beyond the first epsilon number. We prove a weaker version of the conjecture, by elementary methods and transfinite induction up to a smaller ordinal.

An overview of the collapse theories of quantum mechanics. Written by distinguished physicists and philosophers of physics, it discusses the origin and implications of wave-function collapse, the controversies around collapse models and their ontologies, and new arguments for the reality of wave function collapse.

It is commonplace today to hear climate change identified as the single most important challenge facing humanity. Consider the headlines from COP24, the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Poland in December 2018. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres opened the proceedings by calling climate change “the most important issue we face” (PBS 2018). The Secretary-General’s remarks paraphrase the opening line of the U.N.’s climate change web page, which announces that “[c]limate Change is the defining issue of our time and we (...) are at a defining moment” (United Nations n.d.). Such statements about the singular significance of climate change—the most important, the defining issue—are often followed by proclamations about what hangs in the balance, and this was the case at COP24. There, the celebrated British naturalist Sir David Attenborough warned that “collapse of our civilizations and the extinction of much of the natural world is on the horizons,” amounting to, in his words, “disaster of global scale, our greatest threat in thousands of years” (PBS 2018). (shrink)

We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories and Higher-Order theories. Like all Higher-Order theories, many First-Order theories are mentalistic theories of consciousness: they attempt to reduce a mental state’s being consciousness using mental (but non-phenomenal) terms, such as being available to certain cognitive centers. I argue that mentalistic First-Order theories, once fully cashed out, collapse into some form of Higher-Order theory. I contend that not only is there general considerations in favor of this (...) conclusion, but that the four most prominent mentalistic ‘First-Order’ theories are, in fact, Higher-Order theories in disguise. Given a strong assumption in favor of some form of mental ism, if this is right, what emerges is a powerful argument for the Higher-Order theory of consciousness. (shrink)