Abstract

This article approaches world poverty from the perspective of rectificatory justice and investigates whether the global rich can be said to have special obligations toward the global poor on the grounds that they have been harming them. The focus rests on the present situation, and more specifically on Thomas Pogge's thesis of a causal link between world poverty and the conduct of present citizens (and governments) in wealthy countries. I argue that, if Pogge does not want his position to boil down to an institutional version of the ‘negative causation'-thesis – according to which one can cause harm simply by failing to alleviate it – and if he wants it to be accepted by those he seeks to convince – namely right-libertarians – he must specify that it is enough for institutions to be just that they do not actively deprive their members of the means of subsistence, even if many of them still do not have the capacity to enjoy the means of subsistence. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (3) 2007: pp. 252-270