Moral realism and the argument from disagreement

Philosophical Studies 90 (3):281-303 (1998)
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Don Loeb
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

As a matter of fact : Empirical perspectives on ethics.John M. Doris & Stephen P. Stich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Experimental moral philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.

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References found in this work

Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1984 - In David Copp & David Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 49-78.
Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness.David O. Brink - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism.Russ Shafer-Landau - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1):83 - 96.

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