Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience?

Philosophical Studies 126 (2):297 - 311 (2005)
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Abstract

This article focuses on one well-known argument in favor of expressivism and against realism that Shafer-Landau considers, namely Blackburn's supervenience argument. Shafer-Landau believes that he can successfully defend moral realism against Blackburn's argument. I have my doubts about whether this is so.

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Robert A. Mabrito
North Carolina State University

Citations of this work

Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.

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References found in this work

Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Moral functionalism and moral motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.

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