Response to Elqayam, Nottelmann, Peels and Vahid on my paper 'Perspectivism, deontologism and epistemic poverty'

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (3):21-47 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I here respond to four SERRC commentators on my paper ‘Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty’: Shira Elqayam, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Rik Peels and Hamid Vahid. I maintain that all accounts of epistemic justification must be constrained by two limit positions which have to be avoided. One is Conceptual Limit Panglossianism (an excessively subjective, ‘emic’, ‘bounded’ and ‘grounded’, relativistic perspectivism, whereby anything the epistemic agent takes to be justified, is). The other is Conceptual Limit meliorism (an excessively objective, ‘etic’, ‘unbounded’, ‘ungrounded’, absolutism, whereby the fundamental normative-epistemic notion of justification is wholly divorced from regulative, human, capacities). Within these bounds one may offer an account of rationality or epistemic justification that is closer to Meliorism or Panglossianism. Remarked upon are my respondents’ considerations on Alston, on suggestions for a separation between a more-subjective epistemic justification and a more-objective rationality, and objections to my position based on the assumption that we must embrace a very objective and truth-conducive concept of epistemic justification.

Similar books and articles

Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty.Robert Lockie - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (2):133-149.
Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
Truth and the Aim of Epistemic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2003 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):83-91.
Epistemic Desiderata and Epistemic Pluralism.Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:193-207.
Epistemic Deontologism and Role-Oughts.Jon Altschul - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):245-263.
Deontology in ethics and epistemology.Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):530-545.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-19

Downloads
243 (#83,063)

6 months
59 (#78,885)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Lockie
University of West London

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.

View all 19 references / Add more references