Results for 'Broncano-Berrocal Fernando'

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Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Universitat de Barcelona
  1.  68
    The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Routledge.
    Group polarization—roughly, the tendency of groups to incline towards more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members— has been rigorously studied by social psychol- ogists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions about this phenomenon which remain unexplored. Two such salient questions are metaphysical and epistemological, respectively. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an (...)
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  2. Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Winning a lottery, being hit by a stray bullet, or surviving a plane crash, all are instances of a mundane phenomenon: luck. Mundane as it is, the concept of luck nonetheless plays a pivotal role in central areas of philosophy, either because it is the key element of widespread philosophical theses or because it … Continue reading Luck →.
     
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  3.  90
    A Robust Enough Virtue Epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    What is the nature of knowledge? A popular answer to that long-standing question comes from robust virtue epistemology, whose key idea is that knowing is just a matter of succeeding cognitively—i.e., coming to believe a proposition truly—due to an exercise of cognitive ability. Versions of robust virtue epistemology further developing and systematizing this idea offer different accounts of the relation that must hold between an agent’s cognitive success and the exercise of her cognitive abilities as well as of the very (...)
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  4.  70
    Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):385-410.
    A notorious objection to robust virtue epistemology—the view that an agent knows a proposition if and only if her cognitive success is because of her intellectual virtues—is that it fails to eliminate knowledge-undermining luck. Modest virtue epistemologists agree with robust virtue epistemologists that if someone knows, then her cognitive success must be because of her intellectual virtues, but they think that more is needed for knowledge. More specifically, they introduce independently motivated modal anti-luck principles in their accounts to amend the (...)
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  5.  68
    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):1-25.
    This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event-relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in (...)
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  6. Is Safety In Danger?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):1-19.
    In “Knowledge Under Threat” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2012), Tomas Bogardus proposes a counterexample to the safety condition for knowledge. Bogardus argues that the case demonstrates that unsafe knowledge is possible. I argue that the case just corroborates the well-known requirement that modal conditions like safety must be relativized to methods of belief formation. I explore several ways of relativizing safety to belief-forming methods and I argue that none is adequate: if methods were individuated in those ways, safety would fail (...)
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  7.  29
    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2015 - In Duncan Pritchard & Lee John Whittington (eds.), The Philosophy of Luck. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 3-27.
    This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event-relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in (...)
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  8.  48
    A Taxonomy of Types of Epistemic Dependence: Introduction to the Synthese Special Issue on Epistemic Dependence.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Jesús Vega-Encabo - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2745-2763.
  9.  62
    Knowledge and Tracking Revisited.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):396-405.
    An explanatorily powerful approach to the modal dimension of knowledge is Robert Nozick’s idea that knowledge stands in a tracking relation to the world. However, pinning down a specific modal condition has proved elusive. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis and a positive proposal. The root of the problem, I argue, is the unquestioned assumption that tracking is a matter of directly preserving conformity between what is believed and what is the case in certain possible worlds. My proposal is (...)
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  10.  28
    Knowledge, Safety, and Gettierized Lottery Cases: Why Mere Statistical Evidence is Not a (Safe) Source of Knowledge.Fernando BroncanoBerrocal - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):37-52.
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  11.  59
    Epistemic Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours. As inquirers, we characteristically aim to believe truly rather than falsely, and to attain such standings as knowledge and understanding. Sometimes such aims are attained with commendable competence, but of course, not always. Epistemic (...)
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  12.  10
    Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement.Mona Simion & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.
    This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing (...)
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  13. Deliberation and Group Disagreement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge. pp. 9-45.
    Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-known ways that (...)
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  14.  83
    No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2016 - Theoria 82 (1):89-100.
    In a recent article in this journal, Wolfgang Freitag argues that Gettier-style cases that are based on the notion of “distant” epistemic luck cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity. I argue that safety and sensitivity can be easily fixed and that Freitag provides no convincing reason for the existence of “distant” epistemic luck.
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  15. Lies and Deception: A Failed Reconciliation.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):227-230.
    The traditional view of lying says that lying is a matter of intending to deceive others by making statements that one believes to be false. Jennifer Lackey has recently defended the following version of the traditional view: A lies to B just in case (i) A states that p to B, (ii) A believes that p is false and (iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p. I argue that, despite all the virtues that Lackey ascribes (...)
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  16. Epistemic Dependence and Cognitive Ability.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2017 - Synthese 197 (7):2895-2912.
    In a series of papers, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive ability is incompatible with the idea that whether or not an agent’s true belief amounts to knowledge can significantly depend upon factors beyond her cognitive agency. In particular, certain purely modal facts seem to preclude knowledge, while the contribution of other agents’ cognitive abilities seems to enable it. Kallestrup and Pritchard’s arguments are targeted against views that hold (...)
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  17. Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):733-754.
    I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem.
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  18.  22
    Well-Founded Belief and Perceptual Justification.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):367-377.
    According to Alan Millar, justified beliefs are well-founded beliefs. Millar cashes out the notion of well-foundedness in terms of having an adequate reason to believe something and believing it for that reason. To make his account of justified belief compatible with perceptual justification he appeals to the notion of recognitional ability. It is argued that, due to the fact that Millar’s is a knowledge-first view, his appeal to recognitional abilities fails to offer an explanatory account of familiar cases in the (...)
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  19.  49
    Knowledge and Disagreement.Mona Simion & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2021 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Richard Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement.
  20. Luck as Risk.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Routledge.
    The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. I start by explaining why this hypothesis is prima facie plausible in view of the parallelisms between luck and risk. I then distinguish three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic terms, in modal terms, and in terms of lack of control. Before evaluating the resulting accounts, I explain how the idea that luck involves risk is compatible with the fact that risk concerns unwanted (...)
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  21.  14
    Collective Epistemic Luck.Moisés Barba & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119.
    A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic (...)
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  22.  44
    The Epistemology of Group Disagreement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.) - 2020 - Routledge.
  23.  49
    Hoops and Barns: A New Dilemma for Sosa.Kelp Christoph, Boult Cameron, Broncano-Berrocal Fernando, Dimmock Paul, Ghijsen Harmen & Simion Mona - 2017 - Synthese 197 (12):1-16.
    This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if safe from failure, this thesis can’t be true. We then (...)
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  24.  35
    Distance From Safety! A Reply to BroncanoBerrocal's “No Luck in the Distance”.Wolfgang Freitag - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):370-373.
    In a recent contribution to this journal, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety conception of knowledge against my counterexamples in Freitag 2014 by adding a new clause to the safety condition. In this brief reply, I argue that Broncano-Berrocal's modification cannot be plausibly understood as a natural development of the original safety idea and that, moreover, the resulting account of knowledge can be refuted by a slight alteration of my original examples.
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  25. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement: An Introduction.Fernandfo Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge. pp. 1-8.
    This is an introduction to the volume The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, forthcoming), (eds.) F. Broncano-Berrocal and J.A. Carter.
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  26.  15
    Perceptual Recognition and Strange Environments: Reply to Broncano-Berrocal.Alan Millar - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (2):207-214.
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  27. Yes, Safety is in Danger.Tomas Bogardus & Chad Marxen - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):321-334.
    In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we (...)
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  28. Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del "sentido de agencia".Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39:7-27.
    En este trabajo estudiamos varios modelos de tratamiento del sentido de agencia, entendido como aspecto fenoménico que acompaña a las acciones e indica la pertenencia de la acción al sujeto. Proponemos que el sentido de agencia no sea considerado como un criterio suficiente de agencia, o acción intencional, a menos que se integre en un conjunto más fuerte y abstracto de requisitos que contienen una dimensión epistemológica: asegurar la determinación de la acción por la intención. We discuss the conditions that (...)
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  29. Trusting Others. The Epistemological Authority of Testimony.Fernando Broncano - 2008 - Theoria 23 (1):11-22.
    I propose to consider the interpersonal character of testimony as a kind of social bond created by the mutual intention of sharing knowledge. The paper explores the social mechanism that supports this mutual intention starting from an initial situation of modelling the other’s epistemic perspective. Accepting testimony as a joint action creates epistemic duties and responsibilities and the eventual success can be considered as a genuine achievement at the social level of epistemology. Trust is presented here as the symptom that (...)
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  30.  30
    Trust as a Meta‐Emotion.Simone Belli & Fernando Broncano - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):430-448.
    The aim of this article is to present trust as a meta-emotion, such that it is an emotion that precedes first-order emotions. It examines how trust can be considered a meta-emotion by establishing criteria for identifying trust as a meta-emotion. How trust plays out differently in aesthetic and ordinary contexts can provide another mode for investigating meta-emotions. The article illustrates how it is possible to recognize these meta-emotions in narratives. Finally, it presents one of the aims of trust, sharing knowledge (...)
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  31. Fundamentos de filosofía de la ciencia, de José A. Díez y C. Ulises Moulines.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):98-100.
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  32. La ciencia y la tecnología en el banquillo constitucional: recientes aproximaciones.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 2004 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (1):99-104.
    Se revisan varios libros publicados recientemente que corresponderían al campo de la epistemología política. Sus autores pertenecen a tradiciones tan distintas como los Estudios sobre la Ciencia, Sociologíael Conocimiento, Epistemología, Filosofía de la Ciencia o Economía. La convergencia en este tema es el dato más significativo, habida cuenta de las bien conocidas controversias contemporáneas sobre la ciencia.El núcleo central de los trabajos es la relación entre ciencia y democracia.
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  33.  17
    Engaged Epistemic Agents.Fernando Broncano & Jesús Vega - 2011 - Critica 43 (128):55-79.
    Our aim in this paper is to throw some light on the kind of normativity characteristic of human knowledge. We describe the epistemic normative domain as that field of human agency defined by knowledge understood as an achievement. The normativity of knowledge rests on the contribution of the epistemic agent to the fulfillment of certain tasks. Such contribution is epistemically significant when the agent becomes engaged in the obtaining of success. Finally, we identify some features associated with full epistemic agency (...)
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  34. La observación y el realismo.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 1985 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 1 (2):481-502.
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  35. Sujeto y subjetividad en la mente extensa.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 2006 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31:109-133.
    En este trabajo nos proponemos defender una versión de la tesis de la �mente extendida� frente a las críticas de algunos autores para quienes los sistemas que llaman �extracraneales� no cumplirían las condiciones que deben cumplir los componentes de los procesos mentales. Proponemos la integración de funciones como un criterio para considerar un conjunto de procesos como un proceso mental. Desde este punto de vista, consideramos que, en ciertas situaciones, algunos sistemas externos podrían llegar a cumplir este criterio.
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  36. Trusting Others: The Epistemological Authority of Testimony.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 2008 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (1):11-22.
  37. Verdad y explicación.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 1992 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 7 (1-3):1161-1181.
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  38. Los límites de nuestro error.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez - 1990 - Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía 17:471-482.
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  39.  23
    Diseños técnicos y capacidades prácticas. Una perspectiva modal en filosofía de la tecnología.Fernando Broncano - 2007 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 6:78-121.
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  40.  3
    Nuevas Meditaciones Sobre la Técnica.Fernando Broncano - 1995
    Resumen: Este libro pretende convertir la tecnología en un objeto de reflexion seria y rigurosa que no se limite a pensar sobre las consecuencias de la tecnica, atienda el hecho de que los sistemas tecnológicos son objetos culturales, los mas importantes objetos culturales de nuestra civilizacion, y los ingenieros, por ello mismo, creadores de cultura con el mismo estatuto que cientificos o artistas. El volumen reune varios ensayos sobre cuestiones filosoficas, que plantea la teología actual : como determina nuestra cultura (...)
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  41.  4
    Engaged Epistemic Agents.Fernando Broncano Rodríguez & Jesús Vega Encabo - 2011 - Critica 43 (128):55-79.
    En este artículo pretendemos arrojar luz sobre la normatividad propia del conocimiento humano. Describimos el dominio normativo epistémico como un campo de agencia humana que está definido por el conocimiento entendido como logro. La normatividad del conocimiento se apoya en la contribución del agente epistémico a la consecución de ciertas tareas. Tal contribución es epistémicamente significativa cuando el agente llega a participar en la consecución del éxito. Por último identificamos algunos rasgos asociados con la agencia epistémica completa (condiciones de integración (...)
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  42.  64
    Verdad y explicación.Fernando Broncano - 1992 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 7 (1-3):1161-1181.
    Truth is an epistemological concept that sometimes is claimed to have explanatory strength. It is argued, within a realistic view about causality and explanation, that concepts must represent naturalistic properties in order to have explanatory power. The eliminativistic theories about truth fail to account the use of predicate “truth” in explanatory contexts. Many antirealistic explanations of truth are reconstructed in order to sustain that thesis. Specially, we focus on the minimalist theory of truth. As we argue, we cannot eliminate the (...)
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  43.  95
    La Ciencia Y la Tecnologia En El Banquillo Constitucional. Recientes Aproximaciones (Science and Technology on Trial).Fernando Broncano - 2004 - Theoria 19 (1):99-104.
    Se revisan varios libros publicados recientemente que corresponderían al campo de la epistemología politica. Sus autores pertenecen a tradiciones tan distintas como los Estudios sobre la Cieneia, Sociologia del Conocimiento, Epistemología, Filosafia de la Cieneia o Economía. La convergencia en este tema es el dato más significativo, habida cuenta de las bien conocidas controversias contemporaneas sabre Ia ciencia. EI nucleo central de los trabajos es la relación entre ciencia y democracia.We review a few volumes appeared in the last years about (...)
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  44.  41
    MONOGRAPHIC: Testimony and Trust in Contemporary Epistemology.Fernando Broncano & Jesús Vega Encabo - 2008 - Theoria 23 (1):5-9.
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  45. Technical designs and practical capabilities. A modal perspective in the philosophy of technology.Fernando Broncano - 2007 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 6:78-121.
    This paper presents a possibilistic conception of technological artifacts facing technological determinism. Technological artifacts are considered points in a space of pragmatic possibilities determined by the abilities of different sociocultural aspects. The determination process of one possibility is the design of an artifact that comes true as long as the abilities are effective. A design is a process of creation at several levels of reality: material, functional, usefulness. At the same time, the idea of design may also include the social (...)
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  46. Incompatibilidades en las teorías del contenido mental.Fernando Broncano - 1999 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (2).
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  47. Medina Sierra, Luis Fernando (2019). Socialism, history and utopia. Notes for its third century. Akal. 176 páginas.Alejandro Sánchez Berrocal - 2021 - Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (18):291-297.
    How is it possible that "socialism" is today a living idea? How does it push us to a review of its complex heritage and to a research into its perspectives? What is the old and the new that socialism implies for the 21st century? After decades of neoliberal counterrevolution, the twilight of "really existing communism", the stories about the "end of history" and the entry into a "post-political" and "post-ideological" era, it may be surprising that the questions with which we (...)
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  48.  60
    Reliable Rationality.Fernando Broncano - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:49-59.
    We propose to extend a reliabilist perspective from epistemology to the very concept of rational justification. Rationality is defined as a cognitive virtue contextually relative to an information domain, to the mean performance of a cognitive community, and to normal conditions of information gathering. This proposal answers to the skeptical position derived from the evidence of the cognitive fallacies and, on the other hand, is consistent with the ecological approach to the cognitive biases. Rationality is conceived naturalistically as a control (...)
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  49.  42
    I Simposio Hispano-Mexicano de Filosofía.Fernando Broncano - 1985 - Theoria 1 (1):339-341.
  50.  75
    Moral Responsibility. The Ways of Scepticism – by Carlos Moya.Fernando Broncano - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):553-557.
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