Abstract

In this chapter, I examine the grounds of the right of children to be free from extreme poverty, the content of this right, and who the duty-bearers are. In particular, I argue that the socioeconomic right of children to freedom from severe poverty: is grounded in the specific perfect moral duty of right to protect children from extreme poverty ; consists of the right to claim the omission of any act that restricts children’s freedom from extreme poverty ; as well as the right to claim the performing of acts that guarantee children’s freedom from extreme poverty ; and is based on a duty which is not of all others, but of specific others, e.g. the relatives or/and the friends of the child, the local authorities, states, and organizations. In addition, I respond to three possible objections against the proposed philosophical foundation. Within this context, I first point out the moral priority of duties over rights; second, I explain why the socioeconomic right of children to be free from extreme poverty is not a human right; and, third, I explain the reasons why Kant is not a moral constructivist.