The Semiotic Structure of Peirce's Humble Argument, with Brief Remarks on Different Kinds of Abducent Signs

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (4):515 (2018)
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Abstract

Peirce's "Neglected Argument" uses more or less standard logical vocabulary, such as "argument," "retroduction," "premise," "conclusion," and "hypothesis." There cannot be any doubt, however, that the musement process as he characterizes it must be regarded as a semiotic process—that is, one that relates a sign to an object by way of forming an interpretant. This assumption follows from the simple observation that, according to Peirce, all processes of thought are semiotically structured. What is more, Peirce quite often uses the term 'argument' for a specific class of sign—namely, one that distinctly indicates1 or represents2 its conclusion. In addition, three years before his 1908...

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