Antiracist Emotion Regulation: Redressing the Motivation Problem

Philosophical Topics 51 (1):163-187 (2023)
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Abstract

Because white supremacy is designed to deliver unearned privileges and advantages to white people, they especially have a responsibility to engage in antiracism. However, many white people fail to do so, time and time again. We posit that, in many cases, antiracist efforts are thwarted because individuals face what we call “the motivation problem.” The motivation problem is a persistent lack or reduction of motivation to engage in antiracist praxis. We suggest that “emotion regulation”—acts performed with the goal of modifying an emotion—plays a key role in the creation of the motivation problem. In some cases, emotion regulation can cause individuals to experience emotions ill suited for motivating antiracism. In other cases, individuals experience emotions that are well suited for motivating antiracism but they undergo emotion regulation that counteracts these feelings. In both cases, emotion regulation reduces motivation for antiracist praxis. To redress the motivation problem, we propose that people can repurpose emotion regulation strategies to increase motivation for antiracism. We thus suggest that emotion regulation is both a cause of and a solution to the motivation problem. Overall, the paper’s 164 first aim is to show that emotion regulation plays a unique and devious role in sustaining white supremacy via the motivation problem. Our second aim is to show that emotion regulation can and should be repurposed for antiracist ends.

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Author Profiles

Nabina Liebow
American University
Trip Glazer
University of Dayton

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