Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):119-26 (1994)

The paper begins by contrasting the unitary nature of conscious experience with the demonstrable localization of neural events. Philosophers and neuroscientists have developed models to account for this paradox, but they have yet to be tested empirically. The author proposes a `Conscious Mental Field', which is produced by, but is phenomenologically distinct from, brain activity. The hypothesis is, in principle, open to experimental verification. The paper suggests appropriate surgical procedures and some of the difficulties that would need to be overcome in such an experiment
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Do We Have Free Will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
Volition and the Readiness Potential.Gilberto Gomes - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):59-76.

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