“Does Dignity Help in Thinking about Paternalism?”
Abstract
Dworkin’s dignity framework has little explanatory value for one moral topic for which it should be especially suited: paternalistic intervention by one adult with another. The dignity framework has little epistemic value for morality regarding paternalism. Dworkin’s conception of dignity is too inchoate to illuminate why and when individual paternalism is wrong, all things considered. Dignity does somewhat better at illuminating why some types of individual paternalism are pro tanto wrong; but not other types. Moreover, the conception of dignity cannot be refined by the process described above and retain any epistemic value on this matter.
One would expect that a very natural -- indeed, a central -- use of the conception of dignity dHedgehogs would be to explain and illuminate moral claims about paternalism. That Dworkin’s conception of dignity largely fails to do so is, therefore, particularly important.