Abstract

In this dissertation I discuss certain of Charles Fried's views in his book Right and Wrong, and certain of Alan Donagan's views in his book The Theory of Morality. Both thinkers propose various scope limitations on what they hold are absolute moral prohibitions . I discuss the moral acceptability of some of the suggested limitations. For example, Fried proposes that moral prohibitions, morally speaking, should extend only to what one does intentionally. I attempt to argue, contra Fried, that there is no morally relevant distinction between what one intends and that over which one has 'control responsibility' that makes it morally appropriate to extend the scope of prohibitions to the former but not to the latter. An analysis of the notions of 'intention' and 'control responsibility' is relevant for my purpose. I also discuss, for instance, whether the moral prohibition "Do not kill' should be qualified not to include cases of 'material aggression' and cases where a person is a morally innocent 'obstacle' against one's life. Clarification of the notions of 'material aggressor' and 'obstacle' is important here. ;I characterize the views both Donagan and Fried put forward in their respective books as 'quasi-absolutist. Following Fried, I regard this moral view as a particular deontological moral system. In what follows, I explicate why I characterize their views in this way. I take up the moral acceptability of the quasi-absolutist view in general on two occasions: when I discuss whether or not a quasi-absolutist may hold, as Fried does, that prohibitions do not extend to 'catastrophic' and 'trivial' situations, and when I examine whether the quasi-absolutist view commits one to say there are situations in which, through no fault of one's own, one commits a moral wrong no matter which course of action one chooses