The willing addict: Actor or (helpless) bystander?

Philosophia 28 (1-4):437-443 (2001)
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2006

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10.1007/bf02379792

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Citations of this work

Freedom and Determinism: The Importance of Method.Mark Leon - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):38-57.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.

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